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I. INTRODUCTION
Command and control (C2) is a process that takes place
within a structure at many levels. At higher levels, policy
consequences generally dominate the approach taken to obtain
a decision, while at lower levels survival and effectiveness
provide the bounds for decision making. Regardless of the
level, the following excerpt from the 1987 Defense Science
Board Task Force on C2 System Management can generally be
applied to any command and control system:
A command and control system supporting a commander is
not just a computer with its associated software and
displays; it is not just communications links; and it is not
even just all the information processing and fusion that
must go into any well-designed and well-operating command
and control system. It is all of the above and much more.
The ideal command and control system supporting a commander
is such that the commander knows what is going on, that he
receives what is intended for him and that what he transmits
is delivered to the intended addressee, so that the command
decisions are made with confidence and are based on
information that is complete, true, and up-to-date. The
purpose of a command and control system is, in the end, to
provide assurance that orders are received as originally
intended with follow-up in a timely fashion, which can make
the difference between winning and losing wars. (Defense
Science Board Task Force, 1987, p. 13)
The concept of integrated battlefield command and control
is not new and has always been an important objective. In
order to capitalize on the high state of training and the
resultant readiness level of our forces, a system must be
emplaced and procedurally implemented to assist the
operational commander by giving him the ability to rapidly
assimilate and digest the deluge of information available.
Data fusion as a machine-aided, data reduction process for
integrating reports from all available and appropriate sources
(friendly and enemy) develops a coherent display of a
commander's area of interest to assist in command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions. Such a
system is designed to provide the commander with a reliable
means of perceiving the environment while allowing him to
effectively plan, direct, and control the actions of his
forces. It must provide the CINC and his subordinates with
near real time data displays of friendly and enemy
dispositions while preserving personnel resources and allowing
friendly force commanders the enhanced capability of analyzing
data as opposed to handling data.
A. THE PROBLEM
With the rapid growth of "expert" systems, the increasing
interest in development of "artificial intelligence" systems,
and the feeling that the next war will be won by the power
with the most advanced computers, it is becoming guite evident
that the development of faster and better computer systems
will be a major developmental race of the next decade. The
rapid rate at which computer science has gone from chips to
mini-chips to micro-chips, from a few bytes of memory to
millions of bytes, and from minutes to micro-seconds of
reaction time is leading to new and unorthodox developmental
philosophies.
Under the current procurement process as described in the
Navy Program Manager's Guide (NPMG, 1988), major decisions for
individual projects/programs are made in the context of both
the acguisition process and the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System (PPBS) . The acguisition process proceeds in
phases, each of which may reguire only a part of a budget
cycle or several full cycles. Gearing the phases to the
particular business and technical aspects of the program
attempts to ensure that adeguate in-depth reviews are
conducted prior to significant commitment of resources. By
contrast, the PPBS runs on a tightly structured schedule. A
single cycle from initial planning through congressional
enactment to actual execution reguires 2 5 months. The PPBS
decisions, rather than being oriented to the needs of a
specific program, are keyed to the larger problem of balancing
all of the programs within the Department of the Navy (DoN)
,
Department of Defence (DoD) , Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) , and congressional financial limits established for a
particular fiscal year of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
.
The seguence of PPBS events is shown in Figure 1 (NPMG, 1988,
p. 3-12) .
The Department of the Navy system acguisition process
normally consists of five phases which are separated by
decision milestones as shown in Figure 2. The phases are
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tailored to fit each program's specific requirements of time,
cost, need, and degree of technical risk. The acquisition
process, though conceptually simple, is detailed in its
requirements as evident in Table 1 which lists the
documentation requirements scheduled at each milestone of the
acquisition process.
The effect of the interrelationship between the PPBS and
an acquisition program is that adequate funding for the
critical concept exploration/definition phase of the
acquisition process is unlikely to occur until 18 to 24
months after the need document submittal and at least 12
months after its approval. (NPMG, 1988, p. 3-12)
At one time, military procurement had to develop items
from scratch in order to take advantage of state-of-the-art
technology. Today, the military can take advantage of state-
of-the-art technology driven by commercial application by use
of the Non-Developmental Item (NDI) strategy. NDI can be
considered as a balance of risk and technological advancement
allowing the services to have a system in the field into the
users' hands via a reduced timeline.
An NDI approach is beneficial for both the government and
the contractor in that it allows the government to forego a
lengthy research and development cycle while reducing the
possibility of a poor return for industry. Comparing the NDI
cycle with the traditional acquisition cycle, the savings in
funding are immediately obvious. There are, however, certain
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One consideration that can be easily overlooked is the
impact on both interoperability and supportability . The
logistical support for an NDI system must be carefully thought
out, especially software support during deployments. An
additional supportability pitfall could conceivably occur in
that the speed of the NDI acquisition process may surpass the
standard Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) process. It does
no good to deliver an item that cannot be operated or
maintained due to a lack of training or tools or cannot be
repaired due to a lack of spare parts.
NDI allows the driving factor of "urgency of need" to be
carried into the source selection process. Depicted in Figure
3 is a representation of how the standard acquisition cycle
differs from NDI. As can be seen, NDI can save a considerable
amount of time in the acquisition cycle of a system. Although
the entire cycle is portrayed, the real difference occurs in
the middle two phases. The standard acquisition cycle has a
concept exploration/definition phase which leads into
demonstration and validation, full scale development, and
finally into production and deployment. In NDI, the
demonstration and validation phase and the full scale
development phase are combined into one phase; this phase is
referred to as the acquisition demonstration phase. During
this time, the Request for Proposal (RFP) is prepared and
proposals are received and evaluated.
CLASSICAL RESEARCH 1 DEVELOPMENT
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Figure 3. Classical vs. NDI Acquisition Cycle
Another method available to reduce the overall procurement
timeline of a new system is utilization of a Preplanned
Product Improvement (P3I) plan. The time from inception of a
system to initial operational capability (IOC) is often
inordinately long due to the approval process, single-year
funding, the increasing complexity of modern systems, and a
desire on the part of system designers and sponsors to develop
an all-purpose end product. "However, a system that will
perform 90% or more of the mission goals can often be designed
in far less than 90% of the time necessary to achieve all of
the goals." (NPMG, 1988, p. 1-11) A P3I plan facilitates
this trade-off between time and performance while allowing for
earlier Fleet introduction of needed capabilities and reducing
program risk.
P3I, an acquisition concept that encourages orderly, time-
phased introduction of incremental system capability, can
accommodate projected changes in threat and reduce the risk
inherent in fielding a system that is dependent on unproven
technology. The concept involves programming resources in
order to accomplish scheduled, cost-effective evolution of a
system's capability, utility, and operational readiness.
Thus, P3I minimizes the technical risk of fielding a new
system while reducing the potential for delayed Fleet
introduction that is posed by using new technology to meet a
military threat.
Besides shortening the inception-to-IOC time, P3I may tend
to make program sponsors more receptive to criticism of system
shortcomings. "By planning the growth from the initial design
stages, P3I permits development of a system that is receptive
to modification in response to downstream threat definition
changes and future technology development." (NPMG, 1988, p.
1-12)
The U.S. military no longer must go through the long,
tedious series of events required by the peacetime research
and development and service approval process. By the time a
modern system is fielded under the traditional process, it
10
may, in fact, be obsolete. Instead, a system can be
developed, fielded, and evaluated by the fleet in conjunction
with fleet introduction (Interim Service Approval)
.
Rapid prototyping conceptually represents the best of both
of the time-reduced fleet introduction techniques addressed
—
NDI and P3I. A proven, "no-frills" system design is quickly
introduced to the fleet satisfying an urgency of need with the
intent of system modification through incremental capability
upgrades. Rapid prototyping is a method of demonstrating a
proof of concept with user participation throughout design and
development of a system based on requirements as they emerge
rather than on theoretical needs.
There appears to be a place for this rapid evolution of a
system from developer to end user in the software intensive
area of C3 . The question is, given the existence of the
needed level of advanced technology, how is rapid operational
capability realized? Both high and low context factors play
a role which must be considered. Low context factors are
those that are explicit, such as the written instruction, and
are easily explained. High context factors, on the other
hand, are unexplained and subjective, therefore are much
harder to analyze and nearly impossible to quantify (Hall,
1977, pp. 105-116). An effort to explain how an innovation
implementation scheme is realized must consider as many of
these factors as feasible in order to truly understand why/how
that innovation is adopted quickly, eventually, or net at all.
11
B. TOWARD A SOLUTION
The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding
of the individual, group, organizational, and dynamic factors
that determine the acceptance and optimal utilization of
innovations in advanced technology. Many systems and/or
devices, especially those involving new technology, will
likely pose problems of innovation acceptance on the part of
both individuals and Navy organizations.
Very few noteworthy examples exist of successful
incorporation of operational leading-edge technology in the
fleet today. Not many major systems are introduced into the
fleet by other than the conventional, lengthy acguisition
cycle of the explicit milestone and phase developmental
process. However, one current embodiment of advanced
technology enjoying apparent success is the rapid prototyping
of the Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS)
.
The JOTS story and the development of the rapid
prototyping concept are a deviation from the current trends
toward a more institutionalized structure for acguisition of
defense systems, with particular emphasis on personnel who are
acquisition specialists. The classic systems development
concept has been a pattern of the operators developing the
requirement, providing the funding, then turning it over to a
material activity to develop the system needed to meet the
requirements with varying levels of user participation during
12
development. This procedure works well some of the time but
often fails in C3I and other software-intensive warfare areas.
While the defense organization creates an acquisition
hierarchy that nearly excludes user or operator involvement
once the requirement and the program have been established,
JOTS and rapid prototyping point in the opposite direction.
Both approaches have valid arguments and justification. It
is not a case of one approach being right and the other wrong
for every system. "They are both right, and a means to
resolve the shortcomings of each technique must be found."
(Lake, 1989, p. 21)
A product of this study is a qualitative, descriptive
model of factors influencing the innovation implementation
process based on:
(1) results of studies previously conducted on innovation
acceptance issues.
(2) data from comprehensive interviews with various
"players" in the innovation and acceptance process.
(3) previous theoretical modeling of organizational change
and innovation acceptance.
Hopes are that this JOTS-based model may be adequately
extended to provide direction for timely integration of future
innovative efforts through rapid prototyping.
The next chapter summarizes useful concepts from a review
of the literature on implementation of change, innovation
acceptance, organizational models of innovation, human factors
in technology transfer, and Navy specific research
transitioning issues. Chapter III provides an overview of the
13
background of the system, JOTS, and the developer, INRI,
including those barriers incurred while attempting
implementation of this C3 innovation in the fleet. Chapter
IV describes JOTS rapid prototyping elements of success as a
special case of the general problem of innovation acceptance.
Chapter V presents and interprets the JOTS rapid prototyping,
innovation implementation model incorporating relevant
literature and case study analysis which was has been





The purpose of this chapter is to provide a perspective
for the study of planned organization change by examining the
major issues raised in the related literature. First,
consideration is given to the application of principles
derived from the studies of diffusion, acceptance, and
adoption of innovation and some prominent themes that run
through the literature on initiation of organizational
innovations based on a 1983 Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC) study and others as noted. Next,
the emphasis is on management's role in innovation and human
factors issues in the transfer of technology. And finally,
the focus is on previous Navy specific implementation-of-
change studies and speculative papers that focus on the
implementation phase of the change process.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE
The innovation process is generally recognized as having
three ordered phases: initiation, implementation, and
institutionalization. The initiation phase encompasses the
conceptualization of the innovation and the search,
evaluation, selection, and decision to adopt or reject. This
phase may either begin with awareness of a performance gap
identifying a discrepancy to which the organization needs to
respond, as was the case with JOTS, or alternatively,
15
awareness of an innovation that may stimulate a need or desire
to adopt.
The implementation phase begins with the initial attempt
to introduce and integrate the innovation into the
organization. This phase is concerned with the actual use of
the innovation by the members of the adopting unit as the
project confronts the reality of the organizational setting.
The focus of this phase is to change the behavior of the
adopting group to that specified by the innovation.
The institutionalization phase, following a successful
implementation phase, is concerned with the sustenance of the
change. Such routinization (Hage and Aiken, 1970) or
incorporation (Gross et al., 1971) occurs when the behavior
specified becomes an accepted, routine, and enduring part of
the standard repertoire of the organization for the necessary
percentage of personnel who will sustain the innovation.
B. DIFFUSION, ADOPTION, ACCEPTANCE OF INNOVATION
Current thinking about the innovation process has been
strongly influenced by Rogers' (1962) early work on diffusion
and adoption of innovations. Reviewing over 500 studies,
Rogers constructed a classification scheme detailing stages in
the adoption process, characteristics of innovations and early
and late adopters, and rates of adoption. His five-stage
model of the adoption process includes awareness, interest,
trial, evaluation, and adoption, focusing mainly on
preadoptive behavior. The overall conclusion of Rogers* work
16
is that a high adoptive rate is a function of the proven
quality and value of the innovation, the extent to which it
has readily demonstratable effects, the accessibility of
information about it, and its cost (Miles, 1964). Davis
(1971) , Glaser (1973) , and Havelock (1974) each list factors
that may increase the likelihood of adoption of innovations.
All three models essentially agree that the primary focus is
on the preadoptive stage; the major barrier is the initial
resistance by individuals; and effective change strategies
must deal with the deficiencies that exist in the planning,
communication, dissemination, quality and quantity of the
available information.
"Given a perspective that concentrates on attitudinal
and/or motivational readiness and organizational capacity for
change, it follows that mechanisms geared to promote adoption
of change are of pivotal importance." (NPRDC, 1983, p. 4) A
professional who influences innovation decisions in the
desired direction, a change agent, is one such mechanism.
Sashkin et al. (1973) view the change agent's role as that of
a "knowledge linker," a term to be discussed extensively in
the Information Linker Model section. Greiner (1967) reports
that change appears to be a consequence of an external change
agent, particularly when the change agent is considered to be
of high prestige and expertise. A change agent can influence
those designated for change through coercion, persuasion, or
17
education, depending on factors such as the nature of the
change target's resistance (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979).
Another mechanism geared to promote adoption to change is
the inclusion of subordinates in decisions concerning change.
Being excluded from the decision making process may indicate
to subordinates that they are not trusted or are being
manipulated. This does not necessarily apply in military
organizations where subordinate decision making participation
is not a common occurrence or expectation, but is nonetheless
a prevalent theme in the literature. However, it does follow
that in any organization, participation generally leads to
higher morale and greater commitment (Oliver, 1965; Bennis,
1966)
.
In a report prepared for the Organizational Effectiveness
Research Group of the Office of Naval Research entitled
Factors Influencing Organizational Acceptance of Technological
Change in Training , Wylie and Mackie (1982) diagramed the
dynamics of the innovation decision process as they
hypothesized it might occur during the introduction of new
training technology to the fleet. Their concept of the
innovation process of new training devices and technologies is
depicted in Figure 4 (Canyon Research Group, 1982, p. 7). An
explanation of the diagram's components, in terms of the
overall aspects (not training specific) , could however apply






























































Initial awareness of a new device or technique is
stimulated in Navy personnel through a variety of formal and
informal channels. Any distortions in this initial
communication caused by inaccurate or incomprehensive
information may serve to adversely impact the acceptance
process.
The trainer advocate (TA) is modeled after the change
advocate previously discussed. Dashed lines are used to show
the TA's areas of impact because he is rarely, if ever,
evident during the process of introducing new systems to
military organizations (Canyon Research Group, 1982, p. 9).
Not all intended users will have the same appreciation for
the operational problem which stimulated development of the
new innovation. This, in part, is a consequence of high
turnover rate among military personnel due to routine duty
assignment rotation. If employed at this point, a TA could
be the source of valid information concerning operational
problems associated with the innovation development, as well
as how the innovation is expected to aid in solving those
problems.
Initial level of interest is a function of the user's
perception of the need for improvement and knowledge of the
purpose of the innovation. If the user's interest is at least
high enough that the user remains receptive to further
information about the innovation, even if not actively seeking
it, the innovation process may proceed.
20
In the absence of authoritative messages, the user's
general perception of the innovative system can be a function
of informal channels of information acquisition through which
the likelihood of misconceptions seem particularly high when
the innovation is viewed as intrusive on other, more
established procedures.
The user's early perception, based on varying degrees of
detail concerning features of the innovation, is viewed as an
interactive process. Subsequently received information can
result in either increasing or decreasing the likeness between
perceived need and perceived features (Canyon Research Group,
1982, p. 12)
.
Subjective evaluation is a primary determinant of
innovation acceptance (Stoffer et al., 1980, Canyon Research
Group, 1982) . Several aspects of the process are included in
Figure 4. The relative advantage of an innovation, or the
degree to which it is perceived as better than that which it
is intended to supercede, as viewed by the members of the user
group, is positively related to its rate of adoption (Rogers
and Shoemaker, 1971) . However, relative advantage alone does
not insure adoption as many other considerations enter into
the acceptance-rejection decision. Compatibility, the degree
to which an innovation is perceived to be consistent with the
values, experiences and needs of the users, as well as
operational compatibility with other systems with which the
innovation must work is of concern to Navy personnel.
21
Complexity, the degree to which an innovation is perceived as
relatively difficult to understand and use, is generally
regarded as negatively related to its rate of adoption (Rogers
and Shoemaker, 1971) . Observability, the degree to which the
results of the use of an innovation are visible to others, is
likely to be particularly important in stimulating acceptance
of innovations about which there is initial skepticism (Canyon
Research Group, 1982) . Trialability is the degree to which
an innovation may be experimented with by actual user
personnel prior to making the decision to adopt or reject.
There are also a number of important external influences
on subjective evaluation included in the diagram which are
separate from the innovative device itself. Subjective
evaluation of innovation development may be biased, positively
or negatively, depending on whether experience with prior
developments that are perceived as being similar to the
proposed innovation was favorable or not. An innovation
advocate, aware of the deficiencies of earlier systems viewed
as belonging to the same general category as the new one, can
play a critical role in countering any feeling that the new
development will not be any better than the last.
User participation in design of an innovation may serve to
extinguish any negative bias toward that innovation reflected
by a "not invented here" disposition. As noted in other
studies of innovation acceptance in the Navy, highly gualified
users should, if at all possible, be involved in the design
22
process (Human Factors Research, Inc. , 1970) . Some degree of
subjective personal risk to the potential user, if only in
perceived threat to an established expertise, is encountered
toward all innovations.
Any Navy system requires proper documentation and
maintenance support. Wylie and Mackie view the significance
of the availability of support as lying in the early formation
of attitudes of acceptance or rejection based on the user's
prior experience with the adequacy of the support functions.
Following initial system implementation, continued support is
absolutely essential to avoid temporary adoption followed by
subsequent disuse or rejection. "It is an unfortunate
commentary that some innovative Navy systems have fallen into
disuse because of lack of adequate support despite the fact
that they were developed to meet widely recognized needs."
(Canyon Research Group, 1982, p. 21) "Corporate memory loss"
fostered by the Navy system of personnel rotation and
relatively short tours of duty may become readily apparent as
a progressive deterioration in the level of sophistication
with which the innovation is used indicates a lack of
understanding of the reasons why a particular innovation was
initially adopted.
The set of properties including size, structure,
leadership pattern, interpersonal relationships, system
complexity, goal direction and communication patterns is
referred to as the climate of an organization. Citing Shein
23
(1970) , Wylie and Mackie contend that a "healthy"
organizational climate is one that:
(1) receives and communicates information reliably and
validly.
(2) has the internal flexibility and creativity necessary
to make changes which are demanded by information
obtained.
(3) possesses the willingness to change as derived from
integration and commitment to the organization's goals.
(4) provides internal support and freedom from threat in an
effort not to undermine good communication, reduce
flexibility, or promote self protectionism rather than
concern for the total system.
Organizational climate is shown external to the subjective
evaluation process because it is viewed as a "thresholding"
influence which may affect the initial adoption/rejection
response of an individual toward an innovation regardless of
their personal subjective evaluation (Canyon Research Group,
1982, p. 23)
.
Authority decisions to adopt or reject are commonplace,
particularly in the military. Still, the users inevitably
evaluate the innovation in terms of their own personal
operational needs. The authority decision will be complied
with on the surface. However, compliance is not the same as
adoption. With compliance, any change in behavior is often
temporary requiring continued reinforcement to avoid gradual
disuse or rejection.
In the early stage of the introduction of an innovation,
the initial response to adopt or reject may be followed by
further information seeking, evaluation revision in accordance
24
with new evidence, further consideration of alternatives, etc.
Acceptance of an innovation will eventually be reflected in
its organizational institutionalization.
C. INFORMATION LINKER MODEL
The Creighton and Jolly Information Linker Model describes
information movement occurrences from source to receiver and
has been the basis of many follow-on studies. The model
divides knowledge flow enhancement factors into formal and
informal elements (Figure 5) . All of the factors to some
degree affect the transfer mechanism. The formal factors are
relatively manageable and identifiable, recognized as things
to be administered or things to be done. These formal
elements include documentation, distribution, organization and
project selection. The informal factors are concerned with
things which are not clearly identifiable or precisely
manageable. "Managerial ineffectiveness in the informal areas
can negate positive effectiveness in the formal areas."
(Creighton, Jolly, Buckles, 1985, p. 68) These informal
elements include capacity, linking, credibility, reward and
willingness. Figure 6 depicts the Information Linker Model
as developed by Creighton and Jolly. The following
explanation of the model factors viewed as influencing the
transfer of knowledge from supplier to receiver are excerpted
from Jolly (1980) and others where noted.
Method of Information Documentation refers to the format,





















Figure 5. Knowledge Flow Enhancement Factors
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Documentation forms include reports, technical notes,
drawings, news articles, video tapes, movies, etc. Language,
timing, the ability to express and awareness of the
understanding level of the potential user are of primary
importance. Effective documentation is of a form that can
enhance the ease of movement of the technology to another
person or organization. Documentation for technology transfer
purposes should be understandable by users other than other
researchers and developers. The form of documentation should
be identified with a specific user or application in mind
whenever possible. If the documentation of information is
made in the language of the potential users, the later
utilization of that information might be greatly facilitated.
One problem that opponents of rapid prototyping routinely
make reference to is the lack of "documentation" in the form
that traditional bureaucrats have been brought up to expect.
All of the rules have been violated. Documentation was not
complete before the system hit the fleet. MILSPECS (military
specifications) were ignored in favor of documentation that
was useable and understandable to the operators. Complying
to MILSPEC reguirements was not really practical with things
moving so guickly. Before the MILSPEC review could be
accomplished, the system would again be upgraded and the
process would start all over again with the prior
documentation effort being wasted.
28
Documentation is necessary, but compliance with the
MILSPEC is all but an impossible requirement with rapid
response to state of the art advances in computer technology.
As long as the user's manual and function descriptions are
understandable and readable so that the operators can use
them, the current need for documentation is fulfilled. If the
system is ever stabilized, then it is likely that some MILSPEC
documents could be prepared, but not until then. And with the
rapid advance in computers, that stabilization will not likely
occur in the foreseeable future.
The Distribution system deals with the physical channels
used to distribute information (Essoglou, 1975) . Primary
distribution systems include person to person, journals, mail,
meetings, conferences and workshops. Distribution could be
oral or visual as an individual sees a tape and hears its
message. Distribution is verbal when people engage in
conversation or when a message is conveyed during a
conference. The movement of people, such as reassignment, job
switching or intragovernmental transfer constitute a form of
information distribution, as well (Carter, 1974, cjb) .
In such a user interactive and oriented system, much
distribution of information is through verbal channels as
operators and developers repeatedly engage in one-to-one
conversations/discussions. Verbal information distribution,
a rare event during the development of most systems, is a
primary distribution mode for JOTS. The continual
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reassignment and inevitable rotation of personnel in the Navy
provides another form of distribution as informed operators
move on to become an information source at their new duty
assignment.
Characteristics of formal organizations impacting on
information transfer include structure, managerial climate and
style, make-up of the work force, policies, the nature of the
business, resources, attitudes and the state of equilibrium.
"The stable state as applied to organization, is the enemy of
adoptive change." (Schon, 1967) All aspects of an
organization which influence productivity and the adoption of
change are of concern when considering the movement of new
technologies into use. "The entire field of organization
study, organization development and management is vitally
important in the enhancement of the use of technology."
(Creighton, Jolly, Buckles, 1985, p. 70) These organizational
issues will be further discussed in the following sections.
Project selection concerns procedures for selection,
standards for approval, response to potential user need and
assignment of resources. Project selection is very critical
in the ultimate utilization of research since one tends to
utilize what one has helped to develop. (Essoglou, 1975)
The entire JOTS concept was conceived due to a felt need
for better C3I within the Navy. Not only are the users the
reason for the program, but rapid prototyping ensures the
operators a continued forum for contribution throughout the
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life cycle of the system. Project selection, in this case,
was an easy decision to make.
Capacity refers to the ability and capability of involved
persons and organizations, both source and user, to utilize
innovative ideas which might influence the movement of
information. Three aspects of capacity to consider are
skills, education and traits. Obviously, if a person does not
understand the technical language of a research project, he
cannot interpret it into use. Relevant traits include
venturesomeness, power, experience, self-confidence, etc.
These characteristics are vague and difficult to translate for
analysis purposes, yet they are very important in the transfer
process.
The developer's technicians have proven their abilities
and capabilities in their areas of expertise—mathematics,
computer science, programming, etc.—and are nearly uniformly
on a technical level of great capacity. The operators'
capacities cover a much wider range of abilities and
capabilities, but could be, given time, roughly determined
based on demonstrated skills and education as profiled in each
sailor's service record. However, it is the opinion of this
author that skills and education may not be the definitive
factors in determining technical capacity. Traits such as
persistence and self-confidence can override missed
educational opportunities along the way. There are too many
"over-achievers" to believe that education and skills can
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accurately assess capacity. Traits will be further discussed
in the following human factors section.
A Linker refers to an intermediary person or organization
between the source of knowledge and the application of
knowledge (Creighton, Jolly, Denning, 1971) . An informal
linker can be any individual who helps the source and the user
of information communicate. The primary linker asset, the
ability to communicate, includes such things as the perception
of the understanding level of others, how and when to
demonstrate timing and who potential users might be
(Creighton, Jolly, Buckles, 1985) . Without linkers there can
be no success in the transfer of technology.
Credibility depends upon an assessment of reliability of
information, its source, and the intermediary, by the
receiver. Since individuals tend to have difficulty
distinguishing between the source of origin of the message and
the channel that carried the message, credibility is actually
a composite of perceived reliability of both source and
channel. Not so obviously, credibility also involves an
assessment by the source of the ability of the receiver to
understand and use the information. "In a transfer
transaction, all parties are both receiver and generator of
at least parts of the information which passes between them."
(Creighton, Jolly, Buckles, 1985, p. 75)
Credibility of the source (the developmental contractor)
is ultimately assured by the user's independent operational
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test and evaluation of the system. Credibility buildup starts
with initial system/ intermediary exposure and continues as the
developer and operator keep each other informed during the
rapid prototyping process.
Rewards and penalties imposed by the management for the
consequences of applying technology that is "new" to the
receiving organization are crucial. A reward can be a reason
for action or inaction. The perceived degree of reward,
positive or negative, determines the force behind the action.
Since JOTS is a top down initiative in a military
hierarchy, there is inherently some degree of reward (praise,
recognition, written evaluation) placed on acceptance and
implementation of the newly emerging technology. Encouraging
local adaptation of new technologies, however scarce and often
impractical in the military, has, in this case, been an
effective means of reward. The active top-level support
previously mentioned goes a long way toward forceful
application of a system.
Willingness relates to the individual's ability and/or
desire to accept change. Awareness is not a sufficient
condition to ensure use. There must be an interest and some
internal motivation to receive and implement a new method,
process or device. The desire or resistance to accept and use
and the degree of effort extended to transmit or respond to
need are essential elements of willingness.
33
The user's willingness to receive the end product is
cultivated and developed by involving them from the time of
decision to initiate the system until the time of the final
evolution of the system. Cooperation between the developer
and the user fosters willingness on the part of both to
transmit information needed by the other for effective design.
The reward factor also has much to do with the willingness to
receive.
Each of the nine formal and informal factors described
plays a role in transfer of technology from source to
receiver. However, it is the linker that is generally
perceived as the primary factor to effect the transfer.
Essentially it is through the innovation and persistent
efforts of linkers within an organization that the transfer
process is achieved. Were it not for their efforts, the
process would probably still occur, but at a pace more akin
to diffusion. (Roland, 1982, p. 76)
D. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS OF INNOVATION
Beyond the dominant adoption perspective, at least four
notable models (Table 2) provide a more balanced picture of
the innovation process. Each of the models concerns itself
to some degree with the initiation and implementation phases
focusing on the dynamics of the process in an organizational
context.
Zaltman et al. (197 3) acknowledge the importance of the
nature of the innovation and the effect of its attributes on
change throughout the initiation and implementation phases.
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resistance to innovation at each stage. At the knowledge-
awareness stage, such attributes as communication and ease of
dissemination are of central importance with the issue of
stability being the major source of resistance. Risk and
uncertainty dominate the attitude-formation substage;
financial cost is of most concern in the decision substage;
and interpersonal relationships are the most important
attributes affecting change in the initial-implementation
substage. In the sustained-implementation substage,
modifiability of the innovation dominates attributes with
disillusionment produced by false expectations as the major
resistance determinant. Zaltman et al .
,
also hypothesized
that a high degree of formalization within an organization may
inhibit initiation of innovation yet facilitate
implementation
.
Hage and Aiken's model (1970) also emphasizes initiation
and implementation equally and regards structural
characteristics of organizations as important factors in the
attainment of change. However, this model does not specify
organizational characteristic influences or social and
psychological variables involved. The Harvey and Mill's model
(1970) focuses primarily on the initiation stage.
Identification of what requires a response, how the
organization should respond and determination of possible
actions the organization might take are stressed. Wilson
(1966) discusses the greater potential for conflict and need
36
for bargaining at the implementation stage because of the
impact the implementation may have on different groups or
units within an organization. It contends that it is easier
to initiate innovation than to implement it.
All four models are speculative due to the scarcity of
systematic research verifiable by experience or experiment.
Yet, together, they capture the multi-faceted nature of change
in organizations and serve as a framework for investigating
the prominent factors operating in organizational change.
Downs and Mohr (1976) assert that while information
leading to the sequence of events leading to adoption is
useful, it is more desirable to examine the processes that
operate when an innovation effectively replaces an old
approach. Berman and McLaughlin (1974) concluded that the
most difficult and complex aspect of the problem of innovation
is postadoptive behavior, specifically the implementation
process.
Sheposh et al. (1983) in an NPRDC study developed a
schematic overview of the relationship of factors affecting
the implementation process based on three perspectives as seen
to predominate in the literature. The Radnor et al. (1970)
perspective is that of a model in terms of a series of
connecting propositions consisting of a set of independent and
dependent variables identified as significant to the
implementation process. Table 3 (Radnor et al., 1970, p. 974)
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is that certain dependent variables become independent
variables in follow-on propositions. The interlinking
propositions characterize the complexities of the
interrelationships of variables that exist when an
organization is undergoing change.
A different perspective by Pierce and Delbecq (1977)
presents factors influencing the implementation process in
terms of three basic components: organizational structure,
context, and members' attributes. Major structural variables
include differentiation, professionalism, decentralization and
formalization. Contextual properties include environmental
uncertainty, size, age and interorganizational dependence.
Organizational members' attributes include job satisfaction,
job involvement, intrinsic motivation and values. "Pierce and
Delbecq maintain that each of these variables is independently
related to organizational innovation and, in varying
combinations, will influence the phases of initiation,
adoption, and implementation." (NPRDC, 198 3, p. 14)
Bennis (1969) offers a third perspective, i.e., viewing
implementation in terms of overcoming resistance to change.
This perspective, emphasizing the interpersonal aspect of the
implementation process, includes interpersonal competence of
managers, team management, reduction of inter and intra group
tension through increased understanding, reduction in conflict
through problem solving, mutual trust, client understanding
and reinforcement of top management. This perspective focuses
40
on the implementation process as primarily an exercise in
persuasion. These perspectives, in varying degrees,
acknowledge the importance of structural, contextual, process
and intrapersonal variables.
The NPRDC schematic overview (Figure 7) attempts to convey
the complex interactive nature of the various factors in the
process of implementation of innovation. The variables are
viewed as complementing and reinforcing each other as they
influence and are influenced by such organizational process
factors as managerial control systems and the nature of
communication. The organization is represented as an open,
dynamic system characterized by feedback during the
implementation process.
Whether proposed changes are unilaterally imposed, a
product of a joint decision, or a response to local or
widespread problems, the complex realities of the
organization intrude and, in many instances, limit the scope
of the intended implementation effort.... In order for an
implementation program to be successful, it must be
sensitive not only to the potential sources of active
resistance but also to the overall pattern of organizational
systems and practices. (NPRDC, 1983, pp. 8,10)
E. MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN INNOVATION
There appears to be a consensus of opinion regarding the
importance of the involvement of top management in the
innovation process. According to March and Simon (1958), top
management fosters the institutionalization of innovation,
determines the mechanisms of communication and coordination
and sets the time period for the completion of the innovation.
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necessary to overcome subunit's resistance to change that
results from a disturbance in the organization's distribution
of power. Radnor et al. (1970) indicate that top management
support facilitates the availability of resources needed to
implement new technology.
The responsibility of management does not end with the
decision to adopt a new program.
It is management that is in the best position to
anticipate problems and to set forces in motion to minimize
or overcome them. It is management's responsibility to
develop an overall strategy for change. (Gross et al.,
1971, p. 212)
The role of management in implementation is seen by some
as primarily that of a change agent. Managers need to sharpen
their skills at diagnosing resistance to change and selecting
appropriate methods for overcoming it (Hotter and Schlesinger,
1979) .
Lee (1977) contends that power, leader opportunity and the
ability to influence behavior, is a concept of management's
role in change involved in all change models, regardless of
their theoretical foundation. Indeed, top-level support was
a key element of success in the rapid prototyping of JOTS to
be further discussed in Chapter IV.
However, it is not likely that the importance of
management is limited to the top strata. In many
organizations, middle managers, much more than top managers or
supervisors, have responsibility for the organizational
systems and practices identified as critical to the potency
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and persistence of changes realized in the workplace. The
middle manager is most likely to be in a position to alter
control systems in order to initiate a change in work
technology (Oldham and Hackman, 1980, p. 275) . Silverzweig
and Allen (1976) include insufficient attention given to
middle management among a list of factors contributing to the
failure of organizational change. Student (1978) views the
implementation of change as
Management's crucial task in the years head....
Unfortunately, few managers possess the essential operating
skills to implement change effectively. In the area of
planned change, managers are surprisingly adept, and too
often failures are explained away as resistance to change,
(p. 28)
There is also much literature concerning management
practices that may be employed to enhance the implementation
of an innovation. Student (1978) identifies the five factors






A precondition of effective influence on the receptivity
of subordinates by managers is the idea that every person
effected by a change can contribute to its effective
implementation. Thus, a clearer definition of the objectives
and a stronger sense of responsibility for successful
implementation are gained. Alternatively, if subordinates
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interpret influence attempts as manipulative and arbitrary,
they may offer resistance no matter how appealing the change
may be.
Familiarity emphasizes the importance of time as an
element of successful change. Mere exposure, the degree of
contact an individual has with the new object or concept, can
increase an individual's attractiveness to that object and
enhance the likelihood of acceptance (Zajonc, 1968)
.
Participants may test the predictability and stability of a
proposed change. This time to evaluate and test a change is
essential even when very similar changes have already proven
successful elsewhere (NPRDC, 1983, p. 20).
The extent to which behavioral change is required for
adoption of the innovation determines the degree of both
individual and organizational stress. Citing Student, Sheposh
et al., contend that the change process must be sufficiently
slow and controlled to keep stress within acceptable limits.
And the organization must have the resources available to
limit stress by support, counseling and shielding as well as
by slowing the change process. (Student, 1978, p. 33)
Including chance as a factor of successful change programs
acknowledges that no model can fully explain the process of
change (Student, 1978, p. 33).
Several investigators have recommended more substantial
guidelines to manage change. Bellone and Darling (1980)
recommend disseminating information concerning the innovation
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to middle management followed by appropriate training
activities provision of systematic participation of key
management personnel as strategies for designing and
implementing an innovation. Gross et al . (197 0) suggest the
following guidelines for the management of change:
(1) making the innovation clear to the staff members
involved in the implementation.
(2) providing the training experiences reguired so that the
staff will possess the capabilities needed to perform
in accordance with the innovation.
(3) ensuring that the staff is willing to make the
appropriate innovative efforts.
(4) making the necessary materials and eguipment available
for implementation of the innovation.
(5) rearranging prevailing organizational arrangements that
are incompatible with the innovation. (Gross et al.,
1971, p. 214)
Berman and McLaughlin (1978) identified an overall
effective strategy as one that supports mutual adaptation as
a project is adapted to the reality of the operational setting
to include:
(1) concrete and ongoing training.
(2) availability of local resource personnel providing
practical advice "on call."
(3) observation of the project in other organizations.
(4) regular project meetings focusing on practical problems
not administrative and routine matters.
Other recommended strategies for managing implementation
emphasize personal benefits of the innovation (Schultz and
Slevin, 1976) and creating pockets of commitment (Quinn,
1977) . Whatever the strategy, "sophisticated behavior-
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oriented techniques are bound to fail if one does not first
concurrently improve the nuts and bolts of the management
process." (Brightford, 1975, p. 13) The mutual influence
between research and management practice is certainly evident
in the interlinking of implementation problems integrally
involving both realms.
F. HUMAN FACTORS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
An MIT conference on the human factors in the transfer of
technology lists six human factor determinants of the
ability/willingness necessary for the development and
utilization of technology as:
(1) training and experience.





Although these factors are discussed separately, they are in
reality interrelated, together describing those human
activities which make technology transfer possible.
Since development and use of innovations depends on
available knowledge, training and experience of the persons
involved would logically be a critical factor. The mechanism
of technology transfer being one of agents, not agencies; "of
the movement of people between establishments, rather than the
routing of information through formal communications systems"
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lends credence to the importance of this factor (Burns)
.
Derek Price noted that engineers tend not to write, and
therefore applied technology of recent vintage is not in the
literature but "in" the people. The trend toward greater
specialization of technological effort and the speed of
technological advance lead to the idea that it is more
efficient to bring someone experienced in a given technology
into an organization than to try to develop expert personnel
in an organization. It is hypothesized that internal sources
are more effective in generating useful technical information
than sources external to a firm (Allen)
.
Frustration tolerance, need for achievement, and other
personality traits vary between individuals. Some of these
variances can be explained by family background and other
conditioning socioeconomic variables. Additionally,
individual personality characteristics are related to other
determinants such as organizational environment (Pelz and
Andrews, 1967)
.
Communication patterns can be a critical factor in both
development and utilization of innovations. Meadows and
Marquis (1967) reported that the commercial value of R&D
projects initiated by customers was far greater than that of
projects initiated within R&D. Cited by Gruber and Marquis,
Cochrane (1967) stated that firms where non-R&D managers were
more involved with the control of R&D were rated as having
more effective R&D efforts (more transfer of technology into
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utilization) than firms where more of the control of R&D was
maintained by R&D personnel. Communication within a firm and
to the external environment was found to have been a critical
factor when differences in performance were identified.
Research by Jewkes et al. (1958), Hamberg (1966) and
others indicates that major innovations rarely occur in the
large firms that serve an industry and most frequently are a
result of activity from sources other than the industry most
involved with the application of the innovation. Several
theories attempt to explain this phenomenon. Notably, once an
activity has become established with a given pattern, the
response of the power structure in an organization is to
resist change by rejecting innovations that would alter the
existing activities. Secondly, organizations acting in a
given way have a vested interest in maintaining the status
quo, especially if an innovation may make some aspect of the
organizations effort obsolete.
When demand creates an awareness of a need for new
technology, that appears to be a major factor in the discovery
and utilization of new technology. (Gruber and Marquis) A
recognized need that leads to active search or inventive
activity appears to be a critical determinant of technological
advance.
The internal structures within DoD that provide systems
development services attempt to link technical resources,
financial consideration and perceived capabilities to meet
49
perceived military needs (a proxy for the market demand of
private industry) . This mission-oriented systems development
program increases the probability of design conceptualization
because demand and technical factors are considered
simultaneously
.
Motivation as a force may be divided into the four facets
of competition, reward structure, visibility of results and
government regulation. Competition serves to increase the
awareness of customer requirements that leads to demand
recognition and the ability/willingness to achieve the
utilization of new technology. Reward structure is a
motivational factor when organizations or individuals do that
for which they are rewarded. The reward structure may not be
designed to encourage demand recognition or willingness to
take those risks which may be necessary in order to achieve
utilization. Low visibility of results tends to reduce the
level of motivation. "Government regulation often motivates
organizations to respond in a given way, and this has an
effect on whether there will be demand recognition and the
ability/willingness to achieve the utilization of technology."
(Gruber and Marquis, 1966, p. 273). All four facets of
motivation determinants have positive and negative values with
interrelationships among the factors in many situations.
G. GENERAL REVIEW SUMMARY
The implementation of change is carried out through a
process which is generally recognized as having three distinct
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phases: initiation, implementation and institutionalization.
These stages encompass all actions beginning with awareness
of a need for improvement or awareness of an available
innovation through sustenance of that innovation within an
organization.
Various models have been developed focusing on different
phases diffusion, adoption, and acceptance of innovations.
The terms used to describe the flow of the innovation
acceptance process vary but follow the general pattern of:
awareness, interest, trial, evaluation, adoption and support.
Some factors shown to be factors in the rate of adoption
include:
(1) proven quality and value of the innovation.
(2) extent of readily demonstrable effects.
(3) accessibility of information about the innovation.
(4) cost.
Effective change strategies must deal adequately with:
(1) planning for intended change.
(2) establishing suitable patterns of communication.
(3) ensuring appropriate methods of information
dissemination.
(4) optimizing quantity and quality of available
information.
(5) inter and intra group tension.
(6) overcoming resistance to change.
Mechanisms to promote change include:
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(1) active change agents or knowledge linkers.
(2) subordinate participation in change decisions.
(3) continued reinforcement of top management.
(4) reward/penalty system that tolerates failure due to
innovativeness
.
In varying degrees, innovation models acknowledge the
importance of structural, contextual, procedural and
intrapersonal variables. These complex realities of
organizations inevitable intrude on implementation of an
innovation and may promote or discourage the change process
regardless of the innovation's independent merit. Management,
at all levels, can play a significant role in promoting a
desired change attempt through:
(1) actively applying effective influence.
(2) increasing innovation familiarity.
(3) increasing user test opportunity.
(4) limiting stress associated with adoption of change
through support, counseling, etc.
(5) implementing sufficient training at all levels.
(6) ensuring availability of on-going training and on-call
advice.
Just as the organization to which an innovation is being
introduced plays a role in the eventual adoption or rejection
of that innovation, so do the individuals within the
organization. Human factors, therefore, must also be taken
into account in the ability/willingness to transfer technology
within organizations. Consideration should be given to:
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(1) individual training and experience.
(2) personality characteristics.
(3) communication patterns.
(4) effects on the overall organization.
(5) mission orientation.
(6) motivation.
Considering all factors influencing change and innovation
adoption including all facets of individual and organization
interaction throughout the initiation, implementation, and
institutionalization of an innovation will inevitably
contribute to the success of that change effort.
H. NAVY SPECIFICS
Technology transfer cannot be considered in isolation from
the organization in which it occurs. Technology transfer is
the dependent variable, and the process through which the
organizational culture develops is the independent variable.
This process plays a central role in the adoption of new
technologies. An organization's acculturation process is that
which creates a mindset for the employees regarding what the
organization really does and what is and is not important to
that organization. This process occurs each time someone
enters an organization, switches jobs within an organization
(headquarters to/from field) , or advances in grade or rank.
When dealing with the issue of how the Navy acculturation
process relates to technology transfer and the management of
change, it is important to keep in mind that there are two
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sets of managers, civilian and military, with different
orientations that enter into the transition process.
Proceedings of a 1986 NPRDC/ONR (1986) workshop on improving
the research transition process include a profile of both
civilian and military managers as provided by Dr. Tweeddale,
technical director of NPRDC. Accordingly, the military
manager has a strong orientation to the fleet and the chain
of command, goals constrained by tour length, centrally
directed mobility and motivation directed at achieving
promotion through good fitness reports. The civilian manager
has strong orientation to the local activity or career field,
goals coinciding with personal interest, self-directed
mobility and motivation toward growth opportunities within a
"keep what you have" orientation. Military decision processes
are often perceived by civilians as dysfunctional and
incremental. Faced with needs for rapid career progression,
military managers often perceive civilian decision processes
to be slow and parochial. Military managers view themselves
as having ownership of command decision responsibility and as
being the controlling official of the organization. Civilian
managers, conversely, view themselves as a staff resource.
It is clear from this differential profile that each group
must play a different role in the introduction of change. In
order to transition research and development into an
organization, there must be acceptance that change is
necessary, the R&D solution is the correct option and the
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resources and support are available to institutionalize the
change. Dr. Tweeddale contrasts the differing
responsibilities of the military and civilian managers in the
acceptance of change as follows. Civilian mangers have
primary responsibility in ensuring that the change is directed
to an existing and recognized problem and assessing the
quality of the information on which the change is being based.
Likewise, the civilian manager must look at the technical
maturity of the new method and the extent to which the chosen
alternative has been tested and evaluated before delivery.
Military managers have the responsibility for establishing the
availability of resources to implement change within the
budget framework. Creating a climate that supports change,
reasonable risk, and encourages individuals to identify with
the organizational goals is the responsibility of both
military and civilian managers.
To some extent, all of the change factors are probably
the responsibility of both sets of managers. However, ...
each group has predominate responsibilities for different
segments of the change process. (NPRDC, 1986, p. 10)
Being aware of their organization's acculturation process
enables managers to keep in mind what is going on at all
levels of their organization, especially at the bottom where
most newly acquired talent that the organization depends on
is actually employed. Otherwise smart, honest, and hard
working senior management may become preoccupied with day-to-
day issues and add to an accultured inactivity through which
acceptance of nonchange is perpetuated. The value system of
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these senior people may determine whether their organization
has an inclination toward change and a tolerance for error,
both of which are important to technology transfer. Awareness
of their culture determining practices should make it possible
to choose more effectively what to encourage and what to
deemphasize in order to foster an organizational acculturation
supporting adaptation.
The issues of technology transfer, probably more
succinctly than any other issue, are a yardstick for the
quality of an organization's management. Organizations that
demonstrate an ability to systematically direct new
technology at targets of opportunity have understood the
social forces that counter innovation and gained control
over them. (NPRDC, 1986, p. 12)
Technology transfer occurs through the interaction of the
characteristics of the new technology with the characteristics
of the organization. Within the DoD environment, acceptance
of change is complicated by the existence of the dual culture
discussed. Managers promoting cultures that seek improved
technologies and support their implementation will surely
maximize the benefits to be derived from research (NPRDC,
1986)
.
Some Navy personnel are of the opinion that transition is
only important if it ultimately serves the Navy in its primary
mission. In that vein, the focus should be on whether
operational problems are being served rather than whether R&D
products are being transitioned.
Dr. Kent Crawford, in the conclusion of the NPRDC/ONR
workshop previously mentioned, suggests ten ways in which the
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Navy can begin to systematically improve the research
transition process. There is a need to:
(1) Develop a clearer definition as to what constitutes
successful transition and when transition is indeed
necessary.
(2) Develop a framework linking mature technologies of the
behavioral sciences with targets of opportunity in the
operational forces. This need to integrate the most
relevant dimensions of behavioral theories and apply
them to current Navy problems may involve better
methods of communication with the fleet and "selling 1
the benefits of behavioral science that are available.
(3) Systematically evaluate new technologies after
implementation. Failure to maximize the usefulness of
a newly implemented technology could result from
complex interaction of the characteristics of
technology and the organization.
(4) Assess the extent to which the current R&D system
rewards researchers who successfully transition their
efforts. The R&D system's rewards seem more directed
toward achieving research objectives than transition
objectives.
(5) Improve communication between the researchers and the
users, especially how well user problems and views are
translated to the researcher. Likewise, the users must
understand the researcher's need to retain a certain
degree of objectivity and creativity so that
constructive innovation is fostered.
(6) Examine whether different methods of conducting Navy
R&D may create user relevant knowledge as opposed to
scientifically relevant knowledge thereby resulting in
more successful transition.
(7) Develop a better bridge between private sector
academics and the Navy applied research community in
order to foster creativity and help direct private
sector expertise to Navy problems.
(8) Encourage more communication between the research
managers and sponsors of ONR basic research and
exploratory development and their counterparts in the
OPNAV advanced development, engineering and test and
evaluation community. Two different reporting chains
increases the potential for poor communication between
these critical research elements.
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(9) Assess whether the structure surrounding R&D management
in the Navy contains the formal links necessary to
promote and support transition of mature technologies.
(10) Given that the aim of Navy labs is a technology base
that is both useful and used , as opposed to research
for the sake of academia alone, there is a need to
learn more about the when, where, and why of the
successful transition process. (NPRDC, 1986, pp. 109-
111)
In general, the acceptance of JOTS as a new device and a
new technology can be viewed as a special case of the broad
problem of implementation of change, innovation acceptance,
technology transfer, etc. The next chapter provides a
background of the rapid prototyping of JOTS as a case study
of successful innovation implementation.
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III. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND
Inter-National Research Institute (INRI) developed the
Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) with primary emphasis
on battle management. Battle management is the total process
comprising the methodologies, tools, and processes or
procedures used by Battle Group Commanders or other force
commanders to permit the force to successfully respond to
whatever the current roles and missions might be. INRI views
improvements in battle management as being attainable only
through
:
(1) rapid development of new computer systems.
(2) immediate adaptation of programs to new computers as
they are developed (i.e., translation to appropriate
operating systems and languages)
.
(3) centralized management of the C3 computer systems to
attain configuration control and standardization.
(INRI, 1987b)
"
It is essential to understand the background of the
developer of JOTS as well as a brief history of JOTS itself in
order to appreciate the significance of its innovation
implementation process. Analysis of these areas reveals some
significant factors facilitating this rapid prototyping
success story.
A. INRI HISTORY
The Inter-National Research Institute was incorporated in
1966 in McLean, Virginia. As a management consulting
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organization, the firm initially offered its services and
performed work for the U.S. Department of Defense and
associated defense corporations. Throughout the 1970 's, the
firm's scope of activities broadened from its original base of
defense systems analysis and operations research to include a
wider range of management including economic and fiscal
services both domestically and internationally.
INRI has provided its consulting services to defense
companies; industrial concerns; federal, state, and local
governments; and government and business concerns in foreign,
particularly developing, nations. Specifically, it has been
qualified to and interested in assisting U.S. organizations in
improving their relative efficiency and developing countries
in furthering their industrialization and economic growth. In
order to accomplish such goals, the company has been prepared
to perform both research and consultant work by the
application of disciplines and the use of knowledge in such
areas as systems analysis, operations research, logistics,
manpower and personnel, economics, international finance and
banking and engineering. (INRI, 1970)
INRI's McLean office has historically served program
managers and branches of OPNAV in the areas of defense systems
acquisition, systems integration, cost imposing strategies,
strategic defense initiatives and trans-atmospheric vehicles.
INRI's Battle Management Sciences Division was initiated in
Newport News, Virginia in May 1984 and expanded to San Diego,
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California in October 1985 with a field office established in
Honolulu, Hawaii in 1987.
The Newport News and San Diego offices are technical and
operational in nature, doing most of their work in the areas
of computer tactical decision aid systems and tactical
development. The personnel in these offices possess
backgrounds in mathematics (mostly Ph.D.), computer science,
teaching, and operational experience with deployed Naval
forces. As a group they have deployed in 50 plus Naval ships
in the process of evolving complex tactical decision aid
systems. These computer systems support Battle Group
Commanders, shore operational control (OPCON) centers, frigate
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) teams and other specialized
activities.
These Battle Management Systems are being integrated by
INRI with many embedded systems such as tactical flag command
center (TFCC) and AEGIS, and the concepts are being factored
into the evolution of other systems such as ACDS and SUBACS.
Specific project work to date includes:
(1) development of computer tactical decision aid systems
for use by Battle Group Commanders including
evaluation, training, systems design, software
architecture, programming and analysis.
(2) determining systems design, architecture, and
algorithms for Naval decision systems to be produced
over the next ten years.
(3) development of an interactive graphic/analysis system
to support planning and execution of Naval missile
shots and manned raids.
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(4) development and exercise of a major simulation to
determine the systems requirements for the next
generation submarine sensors.
(5) development and evaluation of tracking techniques to
support long range cruise missile weapon attacks on
ship or land targets.
(6) planning of optimal asset employment to achieve
threshold goals in the areas of anti-submarine and
anti-air warfare. (INRI, 1988)
An exhaustive list of INRI corporate contract experiences
would be overwhelming. However, those project areas mentioned
above are sufficient to recognize that the bulk of the
workload in the 1980' s has largely paralleled significant
advancements in leading-edge computer technologies.
B. JOTS EVOLUTION
The history of computers as battle management tools
through tactical decision aids (TDA) began in the not too
distant past. In the early 1970' s, there was some cautious
use of computers to test their use as planning aids. By 1977,
there was enough evidence of potential to establish model
managers at the fleet level. The funding was modest, in the
hundreds of thousands. The objective was to develop special
purpose TDAs mostly as not-to-interfere experimental models.
With no real support after development, this effort became an
unsuccessful attempt to evolve into a program. (INRI, 1984)
Before the advent of desk-top computers in 197 5, the only
computer-based tactical decision aids operational in the Fleet
were those associated with or embedded in specific sensor or
weapon systems, those comprising Naval Tactical Data System
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(NTDS) and a few hand-held targeting aids developed for the
submarine force in the early 1970' s. The AEGIS weapon system
promised a better integration of computers with battle
functions within the individual unit, but it was not afloat in
1975 and even by 1985 not fully integrated with the Battle
Group.
In the submarine force, from the early 1970' s, slow hand-
held computers assisted in targeting, and in some laboratories
large scale computers handled advanced problems with no means
of transporting their capabilities to the fleet. At the same
time, new and proposed weapon systems (U.S. and Soviet) were
forcing better means of coordinating naval assets and
providing faster and better solutions to important tactical
problems. The introduction of powerful desktop computers
showed promise for full integration with existing computer
systems and provided a means for developing dynamic computer
support for Battle Management.
Software to support decision making by the Battle Group
Commander was at first developed unsystematically with the
various activities arranging for the aids they needed on an
individual basis. Operational commanders could look forward
to a long developmental cycle prior to approval of tactical
decision aids under normal procedures. In the meantime, rapid
advances in the art of warfare forced an examination of new
technologies for tactical applications. There was a need for
single function aids operating off-line and discrete from
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other networked data links. In addition, there was the need
for the development of multi-functional integrated aids
operating with full use of external data. In a multi-mission,
composite warfare environment, an ASW picture could become an
anti-air warfare (AAW) picture with the firing of one
submarine launched cruise missile. In an environment of
shrinking battle time and expanding battle space, the
commander needs a near real time picture with rapid and
dynamic display and/or alternative courses of action. (INRI,
1985)
The Joint Operational Tactical System, in 1981, was a step
away from the single function, single purpose aids. In this
initial step towards a battle management system, useful single
purpose aids were linked together crudely into a loosely
related whole. The user could run selected programs but data
exchange among programs was minimal. The most important
deficiency was the lack of automated inputs. Despite the
system's shortcomings, the aids had come together in a single
system and the concept of an integrated TDA had been born.
The next stage in the development of a decision aid system
was the "integration" of the database, as in JOTS II. Even
though the programs still functioned as single function aids,
they now allowed for the later development of more complex
forms of integration, including computer generated alerts and
prompts. The single function aids were being woven into a
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system, and the stage was set for the real time processing of
link data.
Real-time updating in an integrated tactical decision
planning system was first achieved in the summer of 1984 when
Link 11 data was intercepted by a link monitoring unit and fed
through a front end processor directly into the database of a
microcomputer. As link data fed continuously into the
background of one partition, other partitions could be used
for the planning functions. Such "concurrent processing"
allowed for planning functions that overlayed and
automatically updated the tactical picture only a few seconds
older than the NTDS picture. By similar means, operational
intelligence (OPINTEL) data could also be fed into the system.
In 1984, Commander Naval Air Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT) , the
chief sponsor of the system, began installing JOTS II on
aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and Mediterranean generating
increased interest for JOTS and JOTS-like systems. JOTS II
did not include the real time capability mentioned above, but
it did introduce a large screen display and a host of newly
integrated programs. The computer graphics screen replaced
the traditional grease pencil and a large screen display
replaced the plexiglass plotting surface.
In the spring of 1985, JOTS 11+ was introduced to the
fleet on the USS Coral Sea. This system included integrated
tactical planning, dynamic graphic interaction, and multi-
terminal displays on a real time basis.
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During 1986 and 1987, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet
(CINCLANTFLT/CLF) initiatives demonstrated the capability of
exchanging digital data among all crucial commands within the
Area Of Responsibility (AOR) and of focusing data in the newly
created Atlantic Fleet Data Fusion Center for CINC level
battle management. This effort involved creating the Fusion
Center as the focal point of the AOR, networking local
automated data sources to the Fusion Center computers, placing
compatible low cost systems at representative shore bases and
at-sea command centers throughout the AOR, and establishing
operational lines of communication among all installed systems
and the Fusion Center. The result of this effort opened the
way for rapid deployment of similar systems at other critical
command centers both ashore and afloat.
The Joint Tactical Data System has evolved from a stand-
alone off-line tactical decision aid used for planning
purposes to an integrated, real-time battle system. Taking
advantage of the successes of the system in Battle Group
operations at sea, CINCLANTFLT sponsored the application of
the JOTS concept at higher levels—the afloat Battle Force
Command (USS Forrestal CV59) , the afloat Numbered Fleet
Command (USS Belknap CG2 6) , and the shore-based Commander-in-
Chief (Atlantic Fleet Data Fusion Center) . The same system,
modified to accept separately developed communications feeds
has been placed at ASWOC stations (Keflavik, Iceland; Bermuda;
Jacksonville, Florida) , in a critical MDZL Command Center
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(Miami, Florida) , at the Naval War College (Newport, Rhode
Island) , at a NATO SOC in United Kingdom (Northwood, UK) , at
a coastal monitoring station (FACSFAC, Vacapes, Virginia) , and
at a fleet training facility (FTGLANT, Dam Neck, Virginia)
.
Complementing the above evolution have been many vitally
critical experiments involving secure landline, satellite (UHF
and SHF) , and intracomputer communications necessary to
provide the paths for data sharing from all available feeds
including link 11, link 14, POST, FHLT ASWCCCS, OPINTEL,
FOSIC, NWIS (Navy WWMCCS) , NEOC, OTCIXS, TADIXS, JOTSIXS, and
others. (INRI, 1987a)
The installations described above are operational.
Training has been effected; maintenance training and
operational retraining are in effect. And documentation is in
place or in preparation. The ever-increasing number of
facilities (ships, staffs and shore stations) with JOTS
installed will soon have the capability of data exchange over
the communications network. The focus for all data flow is
the Atlantic Data Fusion Center whose functionality is the
basis for other centers which together will comprise a
worldwide Navy Battle Management System. The Atlantic Fleet
system is being expanded and enhanced allowing advanced
systems being installed in the Pacific Fleet to similarly
focus at the PacFleet Fusion Center. Now JOTS, having been
proven both afloat and ashore, will be extended for use
throughout the AORs at each site that can be networked
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including all shore based command centers, MDZL, ASWOCs, all
afloat high value unit (HVU) command centers, training center
locations and Navy Space Command Facilities. Further
development of JOTS in the Pacific and Mediterranean will
complement the Atlantic fusion design with the potential to
form a Worldwide Naval Data Fusion Network in the not-too-
distant future (INRI, 1986).
The development of JOTS as an Integrated Tactical Decision
Aid (ITDA) was accepted by the Atlantic Fleet Carrier Battle
Groups (CVBGs) , not as a static and intractable system, but as
a dynamic and growing system that is responsive to Fleet
needs. The other services and DARPA have shown interest in
the JOTS type of architecture as directly applicable to their
programs
.
The folowing highlights of the JOTS development show the
rapid advances made and the major breakthroughs which
permitted those advances to happen:
May 1983 JOTS I was the first integrated tactical decision
aid (TDA) system for flag staffs with single
purpose planning aids linked together with
minimal data exchange among programs but still
with no automated inputs. Five carrier staffs
had JOTS installed.
May 1984 JOTS II consisted of two or three computer
stations on a carrier using a common database.
The database was somewhat limited; active data
fed in manually but stations were still single
purpose TDA's. JOTS was installed on ten ships.
July 1984 JOTS IIA was a refined and enhanced system with
the addition of a large screen display and new
programs. JOTS was installed on 14 ships.
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August 1984 Link 11 was automatically fed into the JOTS
database from a down link giving real time
capability to the system.
March 1985 JOTS 11+ allowed multi-terminal operations to be
tied to a common display utilizing parallel
processing and making TDA's interactive. JOTS
was installed on 17 ships.
May 1985 OPINTEL and Link 14 inputs were added to the
system with message generation and inter-computer
contact exchange. JOTS was installed on 24
ships.
August 1985 JOTS established a tie to the FDDS rainform gold
message system with a two way exchange. JOTS was
installed on 33 ships.
January 1986 JOTS III was the first integrated computer system
on a ship with a single database and fibre optic
buses between computer stations and the color
plotter. Inter-computer planning, alerts and a
color plotter were new additions. JOTS III was
installed on the USS Nimitz and Yorktown.
April 1986 JOTS IV was a networked 7 computer system
installed on the USS Forrestal Battle Group with
all the features to date plus intership/shore
data link (IJDL) permitting data transmission via
satellite among JOTS computers. JOTS was
installed at Keflavik ASWOC and successfully
communicated with the CLF command center at 2400
baud.
May 1986 INRI demonstrated the large screen display in the
CLF command center using the new GE light valve
driven by the HP902 JOTS computer.
June 1986 The USS Belknap deployed to become the COMSIXFLT
flagship as the first JOTS equipped Fleet
flagship. Line-of-sight (LOS) data transfer
between the USS Forrestal and MacDonough proved
the concept of LOS battle coordination between
ships with IJDL.
July 1986 JOTS was integrated with the Tomahawk cruise
missile (Tepee) , the High Interest Target (HIT)
broadcast system, the Tomahawk Weapon Control
System (TWS) onboard the USS Iowa, FDDS onboard
the USS Nimitz, and the OTH-GOLD formatted HIT
broadcast onboard the USS South Carolina.
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September
1986 AWACS data stream receipt commenced at the CLF
command center.
October 1986 The JOTS interface with the ASWCCS net was
established with SHF communications between CLF
and the ASWOCS. The JOTS interface with ON-
143 (V) 6 initiated the JOTS Information Exchange
System (JOTSIXS) for two-way tactical data
exchange between JOTS installations via
satellite. Secure landline data transfer was
demonstrated at 24 00 baud between any JOTS
computers which have a Secure Telephone Unit
(STU) II available.
November
1986 JOTS was installed at Northwood UK SOC as the
first link to NATO. Testing was satisfactory
between Northwood and CLF. JOTS was also
installed at Naval War College, Rhode Island;
Fleet Activity Center, FACSFAC, Vacapes; and the
Bermuda ASWOC. WWMCCS was tied into the JOTS
system through NWIS.
January 1987 JOTS was installed at COMNAVSPACOM,




July 1987 Two JOTS systems were installed at TAC-f irst USAF
installation. JOTS deployed on both the USS
Missouri BG and the USS Coral Sea BG. An
installation at the JCS office tied into CLF,
IJDS, and CMEF. A demonstration installation was
established at USCENTCOM, Tampa, Florida.
August 1987 JOTS was installed at USCENTCOM, MacDill AFB.
Four units were installed at Wallops Island NWDS,
and a site survey was completed for an





JOTS was installed at the CNO National Command
Center, USSPACOM Peterson AFB, NISC and
NAVSPACOM, Dahlgren, Virginia. (INRI, 1987c)
Much of the past three years has been devoted to
replication of the system programs and continual
enhancement and expansion to more ships and major
command centers. The JOTS systems have been
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moved to UNIX-C, transported to the SUN DTC2
computers, and installed at all major CINCS.
It is interesting to note that these advances in the
warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Fleet were accomplished
by a relatively small group of dedicated technical people, led
by a few motivated strong-willed people using one standard
desktop computer and making use of existing fleet
capabilities, sensors and communication installations. Except
for a large screen display which became a necessity as the
program matured and some ancilliary equipment needed to adapt
or screen data, no new hardware was required. Yet the system
has evolved from a single purpose, stand-alone tactical
decision aid to a capability of a worldwide fusion system
capable of transferring battle management data among all




The road to success in performing this contractual work
for the government was not free from roadblocks, delays, nay-
sayers, skeptics, and bureaucrats who, to varying degrees,
dislike rapid progress not accomplished "according to the
book."
Any new innovative system is likely to displace an/some
old system(s) —some of which are still in the formative stages
with years of very ample funding ahead. The companies who are
involved in those programs are apt to feel threatened by a new
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kid on the block and some managers, military and civilian
alike, tend to be over protective of their programs/systems
and oppose the new program. At times, this is done only to
protect themselves and their people having little to do with
the merit of their program. If a $200 million program planned
over the next five years can be done in as little as one or
two years for $5 million, the high priced companies are
threatened. Some feel that those threatened companies have
sufficient political clout to get those in favor of "the new
program" discredited and cause the new program to be delayed
or even dropped. Some fear, as a small company, INRI may be
able to do the job faster, better and for less expenditure of
funds. There seems to be great apprehension that a rapid
prototyping approach may take away the big cash programs from
the big companies.
It is very likely that the rapid prototyping approach will
save billions of dollars, even if only considering the time
saved prior to realization of an operational fleet system.
But if that is so, it would put a lot of people out of work
which is something Congress is not likely to be in favor of.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a significant number of
contractors are both qualified and willing to do what is
required to make rapid prototyping work (to be explained fully
in Chapter IV) . In other words, much of the slow development
of military systems may be the result of political pressures,
civil service fear of proliferation of systems, the desire to
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put everything under MILSPEC standards and forcing everything
to operate under the cumbersome PPBS system. None of the
above is consistent with the rapid prototyping process.
Another problem facing the JOTS development company is the
matter of company size. One of the fundamental issues of most
major programs is that they are under the large corporations
where layering and internal bureacracy tend to hamper
progress. The bottom line, profit, often drives the program
and integration of the system does not get done. The
technical expertise that brought a company to the forefront
in their field may eventually be promoted to the higher-paid
positions in management diluting the technical prowess with
increased size. Although there are undoubtedly highly capable
people within the large corporations, they are too frequently
unable to do an effective job of integration. INRI is very
conscious of the fact that their corporate President and Vice
President must not get too bogged down in routine management
lest their company lose that technical expertise for which
they are currently highly regarded.
Another cause of delay in the rapid prototyping of JOTS is
due to mandates on competition for successive program
contracts. There is no way that the JOTS program can be
expanded on a sole source basis in today's climate of
competition. There is a very real risk that a less capable
company may win a competition on price alone, but will not be
able to do the job and the program will fail. There is a very
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real possibility that the Navy's warfighting capability could
be sacrificed in the name of competition. Competition did in
fact slow things down as one fleet support contract initially
won by INRI was overturned after a protest by a competing
contractor which has since proven to be less capable. Another
contract was won by an company without sufficient
developmental capability and the Type Commander directly
effected by that contract has suffered, in capability, ever
since. That was not the fault of the type commander but was
apparently the fault of the procurement system that insisted
that "cheap is best."
Another barrier to rapid progress stems from the apparent
scarcity of forward-looking, risk taking, positive thinkers
in top ranking key positions who are willing to take on the
system and disrupt the checklist oriented bureaucracy.
Perhaps, in peacetime, it is possible to get ahead if one goes
"by the book," avoids "rocking the boat," and takes no risks
looking only far enough ahead to complete a tour of duty and
move on. The author of this thesis believes that this is not
merely a symptom of top ranking officers but an attitude that
is perpetuated throughout the ranks. Just getting the proper
"tickets punched" in order to continue to advance is a sad but
accurate reality for many officers today.
There does seem to be another problem which is nearly
exclusive to top level officers. It appears that at greater
rank, greater merit is associated with programs of greater
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dollars. Admirals are inclined to sponsor huge money
programs, not relatively inexpensive programs at "a Captain's
budget." Bigger is better; or is it?
Some other barriers faced by all software intensive
innovations within the military were brought out in a briefing
by Bud Wassgett from Combat Systems Integration and Testing
(CSIT) presented to an acquisition class at Naval Postgraduate
School in Fall 1989. Wassgett claims there is an inherent
perception problem when it comes down to bullets versus bytes.
Table 4 depicts some myths and misunderstandings that affect
high level decisions concerning software. "Bottom line: Real
men buy bullets. . .not bytes." (Wassgett, 1989)
The same presentation by CSIT highlighted a report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Software.
The number of software qualified military officers has
been essentially constant over the past decade, despite
exponential growth in software. Many studies have
recommended actions that need to be taken... the number has
not increased . (Wassgett, 1989)
For the military to continue to lack officers qualified in
software only serves to ensure the continued existense of
authority figures who are not educated to the point that they
can ask intelligent questions ensuring program status






* Bullets are something
you bite
* Bullets and gunpowder
go "bang"
* "Real men" make bullets
* Only superman can stop a
speeding bullet
Bytes (and computers)
* S/W is composed of bytes
* S/W is silent
* Gremlins make S/W... then
live in it
* Anything and everything
stops software
* Bullets are immune to disease * Software carry viruses
* Bullets go fast
* Bullets are for your
protection
* Bullets can kill, maim,
destroy
* Software never goes fast
enough
* Software must be
protected





IV. RAPID PROTOTYPING: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS
JOTS was born in the minds of Navy's Battle Group
Commanders as a warfighting system—a unified collection of
tactical decision aids. Its premise is that the U.S. must
constantly and immediately upgrade its warfighting capability
when the need arises—when the threat capability changes, when
the technological base offers new capabilities for system
integration and enhancement, or when we learn a little better
how to employ what we already have.
Historically JOTS served first as a sketch pad for the
battle planner and his staff, as a static, off-line graphic
aid. JOTS eventually grew to become a near real-time tactical
system incorporating automated data through existing link and
intelligence feeds whose real-time contact reports could be
operated on by a host of so-called decision aid functions.
(INRI, 1987b)
System development, working on the leading edge of the
technology base, has been a cost-effective means of battle
planning for the increasingly complex environment of
contemporary warfare. Rather than first developing JOTS in a
laboratory setting and then delivering it to the fleet for
test and evaluation, JOTS was developed at sea in the
operational environment of its intended use by continuous
interaction with the end user. Rather than freezing system
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capabilities at one technological level, JOTS has been
designed to incorporate flexibility and growth as dictated by
advances in tactics and technology.
As the Navy's multi-computer, multi-communications command
and control system, JOTS integrates the battle picture at any
and all levels of command in all the world's ocean areas and
is utilized operationally worldwide for data fusion, transfer
display and manipulation. Because it is an operational,
evolutionary system, it continues to grow with the field
commanders who define reguirements in a rapid development mode
to meet the threat. This rapid prototyping concept is a means
of keeping pace with technology by marrying new innovations
with system requirements. Many ingredients appear to have
been essential for this successful rapid prototyping of JOTS
in the fleet including:
(1) on-going configuration management.
(2) aggressive support of users.
(3) advanced planning and coordination.
(4) accelerated procurement cycle.
(5) acceptance testing criteria/program.
(6) a complete installation/maintenance support package.
(7) extensive training/ implementation.
(8) life cycle support for maintenance, troubleshooting,
and upgrading.
Additionally, vital to the widespread acceptance of the JOTS
rapid prototyping effort in the fleet are:
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(1) top level support.
(2) the right people to provide liaison between the
developers technicians and the Navy's operators.
A. TOP-LEVEL SUPPORT
The success of today's battle management system in the
fleet is due in part to the support and efforts of three
principal individuals and a large number of supporters. Those
individuals are Dr. Frank Engel, Dr. William Reckmeyer, and
Adm. Jerry Tuttle. Dr. Engel provided the essential technical
expertise. Dr. Reckmeyer provided the corporation and
financial support. Admiral Tuttle provided the much-needed,
strong, top level support—the importance of which cannot be
overstated. Other supporters have included a long list of
naval officers, from Four Star Admirals down to Commanders.
The junior officers in the fleet have also been supporters,
but rarely are they able to expose the virtues of JOTS to the
world. Fortunately, Adm. Tuttle was and is in just that
position.
JOTS got its start in 1981 when Rear Adm. Tuttle was
Commander Carrier Division Eight, in his flagship USS America.
As Adm. Tuttle moved up, so did JOTS: 198 3, Rear Adm. Tuttle,
Commander Carrier Group Two; 1986, Vice Adm. Tuttle, Deputy
CINCLANTFLT; 1987, Director of J-6 (JCS) Command Control and
Communications. Thanks to his efforts, JOTS became part of
day-to-day operations onboard ships, in fleet headquarters,
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and in the National Military Command Center. JOTS has reached
the top of the DoD C3I hierarchy. (Lake, 1989)
Inside the Navy writes that JOTS may become the chief C3
system used by all services throughout the world according to
Admiral Tuttle in a recent interview. "When it is suggested
that JOTS could replace many different command and control
systems, Admiral Tuttle replies, 'Hopefully, it replaces
all'." (Inside the Navy, 1989. p. 4) Share his beliefs or
not, one cannot help but admire his confidence in the system.
Unwavering top level support, like that demonstrated by
Admiral Tuttle for JOTS, can only help to accelerate the pace
of acceptance throughout the fleet.
Like the Navy, INRI's Battle Management Division is not
without its own top level support for the JOTS program. Dr.
William Reckmeyer (INRI president, treasurer and chief
executive officer (CEO) ) provided both the corporation and the
financial support. As became quite evident in an interview by
the author with Dr. Reckmeyer in September 1989, however, he
has contributed something beyond those tangible items. Dr.
Reckmeyer provides something of perhaps even greater demand.
He has established a mindset of creative, forward-looking,
integration thinking. His inclination is clearly evident from
the contents of the Inter-National Research Institute brochure
from approximately 1970. Reckmeyer writes, "Attitudes— in the
presence of facts—may well be more significant than the facts
themselves" and "Technology and Management, Motivated to
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Service, Working Today... For Tomorrow." (INRI, 1970, pp. 1,
9-10)
Originally, INRI was headed by Dr. Reckmeyer with everyone
reporting directly to him. There was no other structure.
When Dr. Frank Engel joined the company, he became manager of
the Tidewater office in Newport News (now in Yorktown) and set
up his organization as the Battle Management Sciences Division
with himself reporting "to Bill Reckmeyer. The Development
Division in San Diego reports to Frank Engel. The
organization is becoming more structured as a matter of
necessity as the number of employees is nearing 70.
Under the old INRI structure, Reckmeyer hired mostly
retired military personnel having whatever area of expertise
was needed by a particular contract. Most employees then were
hired as consultants and worked as necessary when there were
contracts in hand. Most of those consultants eventually
became full-time employees. At that time, INRI was still more
or less a "think tank" of management consultants.
When Frank Engel came to the company, INRI stood at about
15 people strong. These few people were able to adequately
handle the development, programming, installing, training, at-
sea support, etc. In the beginning, work was concentrated on
the carriers and battle group staffs and the number of
installations remained limited. It was when the system was
expanded to cover the subordinate commanders and then the
individual units of a battle group that the burden increased.
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These early employees were able to cover a lot of area as they
made numerable COD and helicopter transfers jumping from ship
to ship while underway to do the installing, upgrading,
training and responding to trouble calls. They have transited
by highline and small boat as well, since generally, a battle
group has been serviced by only one person underway.
At that point, most of the basic programming for JOTS was
done by Dr. Frank Engel himself. That which was done by his
people was almost inevitably reviewed in detail by him
personally. For new developments, that is still the case.
Frank knew programming and learned tactics and battle
management at sea with the staffs, admirals, and ships
officers and enlisted during his development and enhancements
of JOTS.
Besides those that Dr. Engel brought to the company with
him, the next five or ten people came from college
recruitment. They made the rounds of appropriate colleges and
interviewed those approaching graduation from undergraduate or
graduate studies, mostly looking for programmers, computer
science graduates and mathematics doctorates. Frank looked
for people with potential, people who he felt had the basic
programming training, but were deemed to be learning prone and
adaptable. Interview questions conceivably focused not on how
much the person knew, but on how the person would approach a
difficult problem in programming.
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B. DEVELOPER/USER LIAISON
Any attempt to transfer technology must include a
mechanism which effectively links the source of knowledge with
the eventual utilization of that knowledge. A simplified view
of the linking mechanism is depicted in Figure 8. The linking
mechanism is not merely a series of communication channels
through which information flows. It is, instead, a complex
mechanism which involves the interaction of people.






Figure 8. A Simplified View of the Linking Mechanism
A basic ingredient contributing to the rapid, widespread
acceptance of JOTS is finding those people who can serve as
liaison between the technical expertise of the developers of
the system and the users/operators of the Navy. These
liaisons are comparable to the linkers addressed in technology
transfer studies (Jolly and Creighton, 1971) . The linker is
essentially the individual or group of individuals who operate
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as a coupling device between the source of knowledge
(supplier) and the application/utilization of the knowledge
(receiver) . The linker could be associated with the source,
the user, somewhere in between as an independent group
(consultant) , or at both ends (Figure 9) . Most literature is
inclined to support the linker as more appropriately a member
of the user team. However, some view the linker position in
the flow of knowledge less literally and tend to place the
linker in the middle not because a separate group exists but
because the "linker" is not an individual. The linker, in
this case, is viewed as a "synergistic effect of all the
people in the communicating chain from transmitter to
receiver." Linkage occurs when mutual excitation between any
of these people occurs as their immediate values match if only
for that particular transfer event. (Essoglou, 1975, pp. 8-
9)
Whether the INRI/Navy personnel serving in this capacity
are in fact effective linkers, having "linker-type" qualities
is difficult to prove. "It is not always possible to identify
a person as a linker, or to find out after a linkage has
occurred, how it occurred and who it was that caused it to
happen." (Creighton, Jolly, Buckles, 1985, p. 73) However,
the qualities associated with "linker-type" people are listed
in Figure 10.
Linkers tend to be innovative—introducing new things or















Source: (Jolly and Creighton, 1975, p. 8)
Figure 9. Linker Positions in the Flow of Knowledge
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Innovative
Willing to Accept Risk
Active in Multi-disciplines
More Information Contacts
High Credibility With Peers
Cosmopolite
Oriented Towards Outside Information
Sources
Figure 10. Attributes of Linkers
innovator, they have a favorable attitude toward the risk
associated with a new innovation. Linkers have great exposure
to interpersonal and mass media (radio, newspaper, magazine,
TV, etc.) communication channels. Possessing high credibility
with their peers affords linkers with a high degree of opinion
leadership. Linkers are cosmopolite—oriented toward
something which is greater than the limited local environment.
Being active in multi-disciplines, they are more likely to
attend conventions, be interested in new things, belong to
special organizations and have personal contact with
individuals outside their own group.
Likewise, there are some identifiable attributes present
in the INRI/Navy liaison individuals which tend to enhance
their ability to "link." A considerable portion of INRI
personnel have had some prior Navy experience, greatly
increasing their credibility from the user's point of view.
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INRI has developed an organization of top-level management
with a great deal of previous naval experience (0-5 through 0-
7) , able to see the big picture and relate with those
currently holding similar high level naval positions. These
men have the necessary experience enabling them to effectively
work both the ship and the shore station problems. They know
how to talk with the naval officers as well as the enlisted
personnel. As the number of JOTS installations grew and more
installers/trainers were reguired, INRI hired some OS's
(operations specialists) following completion of their naval
commitment—home-grown linkers. These installers/trainers
joining the INRI organization directly from an OS billet are
in a uniguely ideal position to relate to the abilities,
capacities and concerns of the current naval JOTS operators.
But for all of INRI ' s previous naval experience, they do not
recruit from the Navy. INRI understands the need for capable
people to remain in the service. They are as valuable to INRI
in place as they might be if they opted to leave the service
and came to work for them. With the right people in the right
places, JOTS development continues.
C. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The accelerated development cycle of JOTS is fed by an
effective method of determining requirements and recommending
solutions which are architecturally sound and implementing
these solutions quickly and accurately. Configuration
management must be maintained.
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Configuration management is the discipline of ensuring
equipment or hardware meets carefully-defined functional,
mechanical and electrical requirements and that any changes
in these requirements are rigidly controlled, carefully
identified and accurately recorded. (Stephanou)
Configuration management may be defined as "the process that
identifies the functional and physical characteristics of an
item during its life cycle, controls changes to those
characteristics, and provides information on the status of
change actions." ( Systems Engineering Management Guide . 1989,
p. 6) On whether or not changes should be made, Graham
(1970), as quoted in Roberts 1 (1987) NPS thesis on U.S. Naval
Ship configuration management, says,
A middle ground somewhere between the excessive issuance
of changes and no changes at all would probably be best,
though. And the answer is Configuration Management .
Properly administered, the configuration management program
should result in an optimum situation with respect to
changes, economics and the ever advancement in the state of
the art. (p. 1)
In 1984, the only configuration management for JOTS
development was in the Newport News office with Dr. Frank
Engel doing the entire job. While the system was still
limited in distribution, this was pretty well manageable.
When under the AIRLANT contract, the CNAL staff made an effort
to keep track of the various configurations installed on its
aircraft carriers. Dr. Engel obtained CNAL approval for major
system changes, though not necessarily for debugging and minor
changes. If one staff wanted something new or a change, it
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was tested on their system and left aboard if successful. The
change was then tried on another carrier staff to see if it
was generally acceptable. If so, CNAL put their stamp of
approval on it, and it had the change instituted on all
remaining carriers. It was a rather loose way of managing,
but in a rapid prototyping mode and with a limited number of
ships (carriers) it worked reasonably well.
The CINCLANTFLT configuration management (CM) board was
later established with the responsibility for Navy
installations, afloat and ashore, for both fleets. This CLF
CM board does not approve the JCS configuration nor are they
in any way involved in whatever configuration is provided for
any other service.
With respect to JCS (CINC's) systems, the configuration is
recommended by INRI and approved incrementally by the J 6
staff. The Fusion Net (all integrated systems) may not be
identically configured at any point in time, but upgrades are
generally installed on a schedule with target dates prior to
scheduled major Naval exercises when all systems should be
configured alike.
As installations became more numerous throughout the Navy
there became an increasing awareness of the need for
centralized configuration management. The function has
definitely grown beyond the scope that one person can
responsibly manage. There may come a time when the need is
seen for a JOTS configuration management board with the
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ultimate responsibility of all JOTS systems; Atlantic Fleet,
Pacific Fleet, JCS, all services, and all allies. However,
this increased authority and responsibility of a configuration
management board does not signal the end of rapid prototyping.
Ruckert correctly states that configuration management is
intended to control configuration changes, not prevent them.
(Navy Program Managers Guide, 1988, p. 4-88)
Changes will always be necessary to enhance design
attributes such as reliability and maintainability, to correct
latent design deficiencies discovered by ongoing test and
evaluation, to utilize applicable new technology and to
accommodate changing tactics and new threats. As long as
changes are carefully and centrally controlled and accounted
for in the management system, they can significantly enhance
the utility of the evolving system.
D. AGGRESSIVE USER SUPPORT
Users/operators are informed and kept apprised of changes,
problems, status of upgrades, etc. User input is sought in an
operational forum during actual use or lack of use of the
system. There is no substitute for face-to-face operator-
technician interface in the very operational environment for
which the system is being designed. Operators can literally
demonstrate any problems or concerns they see in utilizing the
system to complete required tasks. Technicians can begin
working on a solution comfortable in the knowledge of full
understanding of the system problem as perceived by the
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operator. In addition, being receptive to innovations
advanced by sailors will nurture their self-motivation. The
operators aggressive support has become a mainstay in
assisting in the development of an improved battle management
system.
E. COORDINATION AND PLANNING
Rapid turnaround of software and hardware must be
accompanied by advanced planning and coordination that appears
well-thoughtout and thorough to the users. Knowing that a
particular system change is being implemented at a given time
towards integrating specific improvements reduces much
operator tension in the wake of "yet another update."
F. ACCELERATED PROCUREMENT CYCLE
Expedited procurement methods are used to procure required
hardware in time for operational use of the system. The
budget process is too cumbersome for a program which is needed
in the fleet on short notice. In view of the short software
lifecycle, the system would be outdated before it gained
approval. Dr. Stuart Starr (1989) of Mitre Corporation, in a
presentation to a Systems Engineering class at the Naval
Postgraduate School, reported that expected technological
obsolescence of hardware is three-five years, system software




If forced to go through normal PPBS channels, JOTS would
require anywhere from three to eight years to make it from
concept to fleet installation, and only after it had gone
through the usual concept stage, initial testing of the
concept, lab testing and OPTEVFOR acceptance. COMNAVAIRLANT,
recognizing the inherent time delay, became a strong supporter
of the system and used their own operating funds to support
the program. CTNCLANTFLT would also frequently "beg, borrow,
and steal" funds to buy equipment using funds previously
earmarked for existing projects such as baseline upgrade, CINC
initiative, and command center improvement since JOTS was not
yet a budget line item with its own specifically designated
resources.
G. ACCEPTANCE TESTING CRITERIA/PROGRAM
Users require a method of verifying that software performs
desired functions to their satisfaction. Acceptance testing
is accomplished by means of advanced test design during
development and successful certification before delivery.
Tests are then repeated onboard to satisfy users and
accomplish training in the process.
H. INSTALLATION/MAINTENANCE SUPPORT PACKAGE
Documentation supports the hardware maintenance and
installation guidance. Installers work with the
representative from the naval unit who will be trained during
installation, as no formal school exists. Explicit
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installation/maintenance training is paramount in a military
organization. Those operators initially trained by the
developer's installers must gain a degree of understanding
sufficient for them to train subseguent incoming personnel.
With only two- or three-year tours of duty, there is no
corporate knowledge without constant passdown as routine
personnel rotation continues.
I. TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION
The most important element of rapid prototyping is
successful training of new functions and capabilities
available in the system. Successful is the key here. To
simply have additional capabilities that only the developers
can operate is not truly a system improvement at all. Once
the operators have mastered a new function, then the system
capability actually rises. This is roughly akin to the
concept of information transfer not actually taking place
until the receiver utilizes his new-found knowledge.
Training covers both operators and maintenance personnel.
Operator training concentrates on implementation schemes.
These technigues freguently reguire staff/ship consent. At
this point, top level support is reguired if full system
capability is to be realized.
J. LIFECYCLE SUPPORT FOR MAINTENANCE/TROUBLESHOOTING/
UPGRADING
The operating unit must know they have a well-defined
place to turn for solutions to problems and that guick
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response will be available. A rapidly evolving system has
little reference documentation when in a constant state of
change. Currently, configuration management schemes are
facilitating development of proper system documentation, as
much as that is feasible given the dynamic nature of
accelerated development. Additionally, INRI representatives
are accessible to users at any JOTS equipped facility via
internal system communications.
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V. DESCRIPTIVE INNOVATION IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
Based on a review of the literature, data from interviews
and correspondence with various "players" in innovation
acceptance, and first-hand observation, a descriptive model of
rapid prototyping innovation implementation (RPII) is
developed in this chapter. The RPII model attempts to answer
the question posed in Figure 11a—what components are
necessary to enable a felt need to be successfully translated
to fleet acceptance of an operational innovation? Those
components, as listed in Figure lib, include:
(1) a rapid prototyping component.
(2) an individual/organization component.
(3) a feature evaluation component.
(4) a dynamic interaction component.
All components must be thriving simultaneously in order to
achieve the desired innovation implementation. Figure 12
details the critical aspects within each component and is
explained in detail in the rest of this chapter. Some overlap
necessarily occurs as is to be expected when dissecting any
interrelated process into segregated parts. The rapid
prototyping component has been described in detail in the
preceding chapter. The three remaining components will now be
similarly addressed.
95










Following discussion of the contributing components, the
remaining section of this chapter presents the RPII model as
a schematic overview. The model is described in a general
manner intended to be applicable to many kinds of
organizations involved in technology transfer, as well as
specifically to accommodate JOTS rapid prototyping innovation
acceptance as observed in the Navy.
A. INDIVIDUAL/ORGANIZATION COMPONENT
Just as one cannot accurately assess a system without
considering each distinct part, one cannot evaluate an
organization without considering each individual. Individuals
bring with them a set of attitudes, beliefs and values based
on their previous experience. Additionally, as an entity,


































Figure 12. Innovation Implementation Components
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beliefs, and values. Such values, along with norms and
traditions, contribute to make up the culture of an
organization
.
The individual and organizational attitudes, norms, and
culture create an environment which may or may not lend itself
toward innovation acceptance. Bennet et al. (1967) described
three types of organizations with regard to their propensity
to adopt technology:
(1) Innovative firms—technical, progressive, constantly
seeking out leading-edge technology, intelligently
accepting inherent risks in being a leading firm in
adopting new technology and innovating.
(2) Adoptive firms—committed to staying aware of current
trends in their present and closely related market
areas, little energy or resources committed to first-
hand searches for new technology, capitalize on proven
advances of competitors in the form of process
improvements
.
(3) Resistive firms—highly complacent, unwilling to be
concerned with advancing technology, committed to a
policy of maintaining the status quo. (p. 24)
Obviously, the innovative firm would have the highest
potential for utilization of new technology.
Digman (1977), citing Mohr (1966), stated that the
existence of an organic management system—an informal network
type of management rather than the traditional hierarchial
structure of authority—may have a beneficial effect on the
incidence of innovation. There is also evidence that a
project-oriented organizational structure encourages more




No matter what the structure, it seems obvious that top-
level support is a must if an innovative effort is to progress
through implementation to the institutionalization phase.
Lack of active support at high levels within an organization
can put an end to an innovative effort either actively or
passively. In some cases, simply not acting at all may be
enough to stop an initiative. Alternatively, termination of
sufficient resources (equipment, funds, personnel, etc.) or
authority may likewise end a change effort.
On the other hand, top-level support can be the vital
asset that keeps an organization in a proactive state.
Lending unlimited support and all that is feasible of
realistically limited resources can have a measurable,
positive impact on the effective implementation of an
innovation. No form of project support could be any greater
than for top-level management to actually initiate the
project. Given that the project is indeed feasible, a top-
down initiative has great potential for being ultimately seen
through to completion if at all possible.
B. FEATURE EVALUATION COMPONENT
In addition to individual and organizational factors, user
adoption and acceptance of a specific innovation is influenced
by the perceived features of the device itself as evident in
the literature. These innovation-specific features are
subjectively evaluated by users profoundly affecting user
acceptance (Mackie et al., 1972). Consequently, the model of
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the rapid prototyping innovation implementation process







(6) supportability . (Canyon Research Group, 1982, p. 62)
Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation
appears better than the idea it supercedes from the user's
perspective. The greater the relative advantage, the more
rapidly the innovation is adopted (Rogers and Shoemaker,
1971)
.
Compatibility, also positively related to rate of
adoption, is considered in two respects. First, compatibility
is the degree to which an innovation is seen by users to be
consistent with the existing values, past experience, and
needs of the user. Secondly, an innovation must be
operationally compatible with other systems with which it must
work.
Simplicity is the degree to which an innovation is
relatively easy to understand and use as perceived by the
users. Simplicity within realistic considerations is a highly
desirable feature. However, if users perceive a problem has
been oversimplified to the point of compromising real-life
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complexities, relative advantage is sacrificed (Canyon
Research Group, 1982, p. 63).
Observability is the degree to which the results of an
innovation are visible to others including the time before
adoption through acceptance or rejection of an innovation.
This seems particularly important in acceptance of products
about which there is some initial skepticism.
Trialability is the degree to which a potential user may
experiment with an innovation prior to adoption and/or
acceptance. This opportunity for hands-on experimentation is
obviously seen as positively related to the rate of adoption.
Supportability extends the behavior of user acceptance
throughout the life of the innovation. Innovations which
offer relative advantage, compatibility, simplicity,
observability and trialability may still, ultimately,
experience rejection if the features of the innovation cannot
be maintained in a favorable condition due to design
deficiencies, logistical support deficiencies, lack of timely
updating, etc. (Canyon Research Group, 1982, p. 64).
C. DYNAMIC INTERACTION COMPONENT
Any model which attempts to deal successfully with
technology transfer involving only a "giver" of innovative
information to a "receiver" is bound to overlook some of the
important organizational interactions and necessary feedback
processes which bear upon research utilization and acceptance.
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How well and how much research transitioning takes place
are ultimately effected by the dissemination and feedback
processes between researchers and users. Members of research
producing communities have a tendency to disseminate their
findings to other members of the same community. However,
dissemination of findings to the user community is often seen
by other researchers as going well beyond scientific
qualifications of findings and their meanings. Likewise,
potential users tend to rely more on their own personal
experience and that of their colleagues than on research
results. With these sheltered perspectives in mind, it is no
mystery why much research is never transitioned into use.
Similarly, the feedback process from user to research
producer can be very attenuated. Researchers frequently find
their research problems in conceptual and empirical literature
in academic journals rather than by engaging in dialogue with
practitioners. Thus, input by users in the beginning of the
research production process is limited both by the virtue of
researchers' natural inclination as well as by frequent
indifference on the part of the potential users. If
practitioners do attempt to make use of research findings,
their experiences with such attempts do not necessarily get
fed back to those who originated the research. The feedback
loop, therefore, very frequently never gets established in the
research production/utilization cycle.
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Fortunately, these potential pitfalls can be avoided
through the application of technology transfer theory.
"Linkers" can play a significant role in ensuring that
developers and users are indeed headed in the same direction
with respect to a new innovation. Direct user/developer face-
to-face interaction can not always realistically be achieved
but, when possible, saves much time and energy of all
concerned. A short hands-on demonstration of an innovation
problem/shortcoming from the users' perspective may save
countless manhours attempting to express the same problem in
written terms which connote the users' concerns in a language
the developer can interpret into an appropriate innovation
modification.
There is no substitute for good communication within or
between organizations. On this subject, Porter et al., states
that the process would be facilitated,
...if researchers and users could establish stronger and
more frequent links, if individuals in potential linking
roles. .. could be better utilized by both researchers and the
organizations for which they work, if research results could
be brought to bear in a more timely fashion on the problems
faced by users, and if research findings were reported in
ways more consonant with user interpretive frameworks.
(NPRDC, 1986, p. 25)
D. INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS
Rapid prototyping, individuals and organizations, feature
evaluation, and dynamic interaction are all a part of
successful innovation implementation. Figure 13 presents a




































Figure 13. RPII Model
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components discussed as they apply to the process of planned
change. The figure is described in the remainder of this
section.
As depicted and previously discussed, it is important to
keep in mind that both the developing and user organization
are made up of individuals. These individuals affect the
organization to varying degrees singly and as members of
formal and informal subgroups within the organization. Some
groups may have a considerable amount of influence on the
attitudes and values of the organization as a whole.
It is essential to be aware of any such influential groups
within the other organization involved in the research/
utilization process. Given proper consideration, these groups
may create pockets of commitment in favor of an innovation as
opposed to resistance to change against an innovation.
In the JOTS case study, used as the illustrative example
of rapid prototyping in the Navy, there are only two
organizations to be considered. However, there is the
potential for at least four independent organizations to be
involved: research, developer, funding, and user
organizations. These four organizations meeting head-on will
be challenged by a number of potential barriers to change.
But these barriers need not stop the innovation implementation
process. Not all barriers can be completely eliminated, but
just being aware of them may help an organization minimize
their effects. Resources in all likelihood will be limited,
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so plan accordingly. Objectively evaluate the overall
feasibility of the project as planned—including technical
aspects, time permitted for each phase, and funds available.
Other barriers include actual and perceived degrees of
willingness and capacity to accept change, capability to
utilize the proposed change, and credibility of one
organization's members as viewed by the other.
The very nature of the rapid prototyping process will
serve to minimize the effects of many of the previously
mentioned barriers to technology transfer. The cyclical
nature of the rapid prototyping process takes advantage of
gradual, incremental progress in willingness and capacity to
accept change, proven credibility of members and increased
capability through continued familiarity and training
opportunity. The user organization determines the operational
requirements for the new innovation and assesses the
functionality of the developer's system as designed. The
developer organization, based on user assessments, designs and
redesigns the system introducing incremental improvements
corresponding with the user's new and/or changing
requirements. The developer also must ensure that subsequent
system enhancements are controlled and managed through
responsible configuration management.
The success of this continual assessment-enhancement cycle
is dependent upon continuous feedback if indeed an
operationally useful innovative system is to be produced.
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This face-to-face developer/user interaction serves as a great
facilitator of information exchange. Linker-type
characteristics may prove helpful in this interchange between
organizations to ensure that differing perspectives and
perceptions are not contributing to misinterpretation from/to
the realm of user/developer. Face-to-face interaction, in
itself, does not guarantee good communication; however, it
does guarantee the opportunity for continued communication.
Over time, users and developers can grow to appreciate the
expertise of the other within their own area of interest.
Eventually, the ongoing task of translation of user assessment
to developer enhancement can become increasingly familiar and
thorough for both parties.
Another important aspect of rapid prototyping is that the
user is guickly afforded the opportunity to become familiar
with the innovation. Feature evaluation could not be any
easier. Observability and trialability are at a premium.
Compatibility can be directly demonstrated in the user's
actual workplace. And, relative advantage of the new
innovation over previous practices can be evaluated side-by-
side.
Through the repetitive cycle of events with continued
dissemination of information and contined communication among
and between organizations, innovation implementation can be
realized well within time, funding, and personnel constraints.
Such repitition and interaction facilitates prolonged
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operational training and continuity withstanding the perpetual
mobility of military personnel. The developer organization
is, by definition, available for the duration, for training,
maintenance, and life cycle support. In turn, this lasting
personal interaction can lead to innovation institutionali-
zation even within an organization as vast as the United
States Navy.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Navy is increasingly dependent upon the use of complex
software intensive devices for the achievement and maintenance
of operational readiness. As the scope of the missions of
these devices has increased, so has the cost of procurement,
maintenance and utilization, placing increased importance on
effective research, development, and use.
There is considerable doubt that the Navy's research
effort related to C3 innovations is achieving its full
potential impact. There are substantial differences of
opinion concerning the most cost effective design of such
software intensive devices and how best to incorporate
innovative developments into those designs. This results in
problems of acceptance on the part of both individuals and
Navy organizations, whether they are concerned with the
design, development, or use of the innovative device.
In an effort to move toward a solution to these problems,
research was conducted to develop a model of factors
influencing user acceptance and organization implementation.
The model reflected a review of the literature on
implementation of change, innovation acceptance,
organizational development and human factors in technology
transfer; a review of related Navy-specific findings and the
elements of rapid prototyping; a case study of INRI ' s JOTS
109
evolution as a real world example of rapid prototyping
innovation implementation; and interviews and correspondence
with personnel representing "players" in the development and
utilization process.
The development of a descriptive model of rapid
prototyping innovation implementation (RPII) led to several
conclusions. The model should incorporate four major
components: a component intended to reflect rapid
prototyping, individual/organization, feature evaluation and
dynamic interaction. The RPII model should permit explicit
representation of interactions among all the organizations
that are involved (researcher, funder, developer, and user)
.
If the goal is indeed to transition research to the user,
recommendations for improvement of the process include:
(1) Research should be conducted in response to identified
needs of potential users, by potential users.
(2) Organizations should be willing to consider and
implement new ideas or initiatives on their own merits,
regardless of the organizational level in which they
originate or even if they come from a source outside.
(3) Full communication through all stages of the research
and development process from original research to
ultimate application is a necessity.
(4) The determination of technical approaches to problems
should be done by technical people, and the input of
technical information to the decision process should
come as directly as possible from the people who are
actually doing the work regardless of their position in
the organization.
(5) There is a need for more direct focus on the
transitioning process; mere awareness of potential
facilitators and barriers to change could help to
optimize the benefits of an innovative effort.
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Probably no single approach to improving the research
transition process is likely to be uniquely successful.
However, this model is useful in structuring thinking about
the problems of innovation implementation. It may also be
useful in identifying organizational processes that might
benefit from change and in identifying areas where future
research on the acceptance process may have the greatest
impact.
Further research could conceivably be applied to comprise
a weighted linear combination of the components and their
related factors, at least a first approximation. Efforts
could be made to quantify at least some aspects of the model,
to assess its utility and to attempt to produce results which
may be applied directly to solve or reduce some of the
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